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Equivalence of attention and consciousness is disputed and necessity of attentional effects
for conscious experience has become questioned. However, the conceptual landscape
and interpretations of empirical evidence as related to this issue have remained contro-
versial. Here I present some conceptual distinctions and research strategies potentially
useful for moving forward when tackling this issue. Speciﬁcally, it is argued that we
should carefully differentiate between pre-conscious processes and the processes result-
ing in phenomenal experience, move the emphasis from studying the effects of attention
on the modality-speciﬁc and feature-speciﬁc perception to studying attentional effects
on panmodal universal attributes of whatever conscious experience may be the case,
and acknowledge that there is a specialized mechanism for leading to conscious expe-
rience of the pre-consciously represented contents autonomous from the mechanisms of
perception, attention, memory, and cognitive control.
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INTRODUCTION
In terms of subjective intentionality, unity and integration con-
sciousness is panmodal or supramodal, but in terms of qualitative
informational contents consciousness can be modally and intra-
modally varied, selective and speciﬁc (Metzinger, 1995; Searle,
1997; Koch, 2004; Tononi, 2010). Consciousness has its contents
in the form of feelings and sensations, perceptions,memories, and
imagery dynamically representing external and/or internal envi-
ronment in subject’s experience. The representational contents can
be processed by brain unconsciously or pre-consciously and only
part of the processed perceptual- or memory-contents reach the
status of being phenomenally/explicitly experienced (Dixon, 1981;
Greenwald et al., 1996; Kinoshita and Lupker, 2003; Goodale and
Milner, 2004; Dehaene et al., 2006; Dijksterhuis and Nordgren,
2006; van Gaal and Lamme, 2011). But what is the mechanism
of consciousness? In the current debate the main question is:
whether consciousness necessarily depends on the mechanism(s)
of attention or can consciousness-level representation is possi-
ble without attention being applied. Increasingly more specialists,
departing from theoretical arguments and empirical data accept
that attention and consciousness are separate and different, how-
ever possibly interacting (e.g., Baars, 1997b; Hardcastle, 1997;
Lamme, 2003; Bachmann, 2006; Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; van
Gaal and Fahrenfort, 2008; Wilimzig et al., 2008; Tsuchiya and
Koch, 2009; Brascamp et al., 2010; van Boxtel et al., 2010a,b).
Why this twist away from the earlier dominating views that
consciousness needs attention? In what follows I will list the
arguments in favor of attention and consciousness being disso-
ciable, discuss why the controversy over the present issue persists,
and suggest some steps for moving forward in a less confusing
way.
WHY IT CAN BE SAID THAT ATTENTION IS NOT THE BASIS
FOR CONSCIOUSNESS
There are many reasons for seeing why attention is not neces-
sary for consciousness. First,maximumconcentration of attention
does not guarantee consciousness of a stimulus that is the focus
of attention. In metacontrast masking, binocular rivalry, visual
crowding, motion-induced blindness (MIB), and some other
experimental phenomena of consciousness (Kim and Blake, 2005;
Bachmann et al., 2011) loss of conscious experience of a target-
stimulus is inevitable despite of the maximum attempts to attend
to it. Binocular rivalry is perhaps the most used and discussed
paradigm here.
Some recent work claiming that attention is necessary for
binocular rivalry presents questionable evidence and conclusions –
e.g., Zhang et al. (2011). Frequency-tagged brain responses were
induced for rivalrous stimuliwith the effect that for the unattended
stimulus this response was weak. However, the frequency-tagged
brain response did not disappear under inattentional conditions
but was simply weakened. The correlation between frequency-
tagged brain response and attentional condition is not a proof of
a causal relation; this is especially if it is not sure that frequency-
tagged EEG signature is a valid NCC. Data and discussion pre-
sented by Roeber et al. (2011) points to the controversy over
electrophysiological signatures as fully reliable NCC and also rein-
states that rivalry continues while attention is diverted from the
competing stimuli.
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Second, selective attention mechanisms are effective in improv-
ing processing of unconscious information. In many cases the
nature and relative extent of the effect is comparable to those
when attention improves processing of the consciously expe-
rienced stimuli. For example, attention can improve uncon-
scious processing by augmenting priming effects or ERP compo-
nents associated with pre-conscious processing (Jas´kowski et al.,
2002; Naccache et al., 2002; Bahrami et al., 2007; Custers and
Aarts, 2011). Conversely, unconsciously processed stimuli inﬂu-
ence conscious attention and attention and awareness effects
may be independent (Lambert and Shin, 2010; Schmidt and
Schmidt, 2010; Hsieh et al., 2011; Hsu et al., 2011; Most and
Wang, 2011; Tapia et al., 2011). The main difference is that
in one case selective attention works on unconscious informa-
tion and in the other case on consciously experienced informa-
tion.
Third, attention can select between stimuli that are already, and
to an equal extent, consciously perceived. Equally phenomenally
salient perceptual objects precede attentional selection. Fourth,
research shows that conscious awareness has specialized brain
mechanisms of its own that are not the very mechanisms of selec-
tive attention (Purpura and Schiff, 1997; Jones, 2001; Koch, 2004;
Ribary, 2005; Tsubomi et al., 2011). Experimental work has also
shown that electrophysiological signatures of the effects of atten-
tion and awareness, especially when studied by the contrastive
methods, can be different or independent (Kiefer and Bren-
del, 2006; Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2008; Aru and Bachmann,
2009a,b; Busch et al., 2009; Britz and Pitts, 2011).
The ﬁfth argument derives from the experiments showing
that in some speciﬁc conditions attention has an adverse effect
on conscious experiences (Lou, 2001; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2009;
Rahnev et al., 2011). Voluntary covert attention to color after-
image, afterimage of spatially modulated contrast, or spatially
localized motion aftereffect tends to speed up their decay from
awareness (Lou, 2001; Suzuki and Grabowecki, 2003; Wede and
Francis, 2007; Bachmann and Murd, 2010; van Boxtel et al.,
2010a; Murd and Bachmann, 2011). Sixth, some aspects of a
scene such as the gist or animated objects can be explicitly
noticed without attention and without compromising the com-
peting focused attention task (van Boxtel et al., 2010b; see,
however, Cohen et al., 2011). Seventh, consciousness-level sen-
tience can in principle emerge spontaneously and without a
preset selective attention. The typical cases are waking from
sleep where one does not pay attention to the need to wake up
now (while in sleep, we do not decide to begin attending to
the environment) or involuntary hallucinating or tinnitus-like
experiences.
On the other hand, nobody denies strong and very com-
mon examples where attention facilitates conscious experiences
and often is the sine qua non-condition for conscious percep-
tion. These examples come from the phenomena of spatial and
object attention, divided attention, prior entry, change blindness,
inattentional blindness, working-memory analysis, understand-
ing a demanding intellectual problem, etc. (Mack and Rock,
1998; Posner, 2004; Lavie, 2006; Srinivasan, 2007; Carrasco, 2011).
Thus why the controversy over attention versus consciousness
continues?
WHY THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE ATTENTION VERSUS
CONSCIOUSNESS ISSUE STUBBORNLY PERSISTS
In my opinion there are four main reasons for this.
1. Researchers seem to implicitly assume that the solution to
the problem of relation between attention and conscious-
ness mechanisms should be exclusive – either the atten-
tion= consciousness, mechanism, view should win, or atten-
tion = consciousness view take the upper hand. Actually, there
is a possibility that attention mechanisms are part of the mech-
anisms inﬂuencing consciousness. Depending on the mode
of its participating action on the consciousness mechanism,
attention can have both facilitative and adverse effects on the
phenomena of consciousness.
2. Either implicitly or explicitly, specialists tend to limit their reper-
toire of brain mechanisms underlying cognition and affect too
much restrictively. There are acknowledged mechanisms of
sensation/perception (for building up representations), affect,
memory storage, attention (as the selection device between
objects or space-time locations or both), cognitive control and
efferent control, and execution. The job of giving rise to con-
sciousness is assumed to be accomplished by some of the listed
mechanisms or combination of their activities. However, things
become more tractable and also more consistent with neurobi-
ological realities whenwe add a specialmechanism to the list – a
specialized mechanism for upgrading or modulating the data
provided by the representationalmechanismup to the level suf-
ﬁcient for direct phenomenal experience of its contents. Why
so? First of all, the mechanisms for the listed specialized func-
tions can work pre- or unconsciously (Dixon, 1981; Greenwald
et al., 1996; Kinoshita and Lupker, 2003; Goodale and Mil-
ner, 2004; Dehaene et al., 2006; Dijksterhuis and Nordgren,
2006; Fiacconi and Milliken, 2011; van Gaal and Lamme, 2011;
Zmigrod and Hommel, 2011). Quite speciﬁc perceptual and
conceptual content can be discriminated by the brains in veg-
etative state and under anesthetic sedation (Kotchoubey, 2005;
Laureys and Tononi, 2010). Thus it is a logical option to con-
sider a mechanism dedicated to producing the changes in the
processed contents so that they become explicitly experienced,
a mechanism in addition to the listed ones. While often this
function has been given to the attention mechanisms, the facts
that attention is either independent of, insufﬁcient for, or works
against target information awareness (Hardcastle, 1997; Lou,
2001; Lamme, 2003; Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; van Gaal and
Fahrenfort, 2008; Wilimzig et al., 2008; Tsuchiya and Koch,
2009; Bachmann and Murd, 2010; Brascamp et al., 2010; van
Boxtel et al., 2010a,b; Carlson et al., 2011; Hsu et al., 2011;
Kaunitz et al., 2011; Lathrop et al., 2011; Morgan, 2011; Murd
and Bachmann, 2011; Shin et al., 2011; Watanabe et al., 2011)
suggest the need for a specialized consciousness mechanism.
(This standpoint is even more strengthened by sound argu-
ments about the non-existence of attention – Anderson, 2011).
If speciﬁc perceptual encoding and attention cannot explain
conscious experience as a dependent variable in the experi-
ments, something else should. Furthermore, mechanisms of
attention are heavily modality-speciﬁc (although work accord-
ing to similar general principles), but conscious experience
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is integrated and unitary intermodally. The general anesthet-
ics act on consciousness in a modality-invariant way, thus
hinting at a common mechanism (Hudetz and Pearce, 2010).
Importantly, the suggestion to add a specialized conscious-
ness mechanism to the typical list is not founded on a mere
speculation because neurobiological facts prove the existence
of such mechanisms. Having no specialized function of spe-
ciﬁc processing of perceptual contents and being also not a
dedicated selective attention mechanism, this mechanism is
responsible for regulating the level of cortical processing by
modulating the activity of speciﬁc content-representing mech-
anisms (Magoun, 1958; Mass and Smirnov, 1970; Llinás and
Ribary, 2001; John, 2005; Ribary, 2005). Sufﬁcient facilitative
and oscillatory modulation is the precondition for conscious-
ness. Earlier, I have suggested perceptual retouch as a panmodal
or intermodally steered, universal mechanism that itself does
not carry informational contents, that is autonomous from the
mechanism of attention (although can be inﬂuenced by it) but
is necessary for upgrading the pre-consciously processed rep-
resentational contents to the consciousness-level (Bachmann,
1984, 1994, 1999, 2000). Thus, and importantly, there is a
conceptual need for the conscious-status-“awarding” (CSA)
mechanism, whether retouch or something else. Now, instead
of asking whether consciousness mechanism is the attention
mechanism and vice versa we just ask how the attention mech-
anism can inﬂuence the retouch- (i.e., CSA-) mechanism. Also,
whether the effect is always facilitative or can it be some-
times also restrictive, independent, or even adverse. Why the
perception mechanism cannot be used for this purpose is sim-
ple – perceptual representations – whether dynamic process
kind of representations or more structural ones – can be and
when related to the possibly available memory information,
mostly are, pre- or unconscious. Why the attention mechanism
cannot be the consciousness mechanism is also simple – there
are too much experimental data showing irrelevance or adverse
relation of attention with regard to consciousness.
3. When discussing the attention versus consciousness issue, the
prevailing style has been to remain either overly abstract (i.e.,
consciousness as such,but not asking consciousness how) when
speaking about consciousness or too much restricted to the
speciﬁc perceptual/attentional phenomena as examples of con-
sciousness. At the same time, no universal, intermodal attrib-
utes of conscious experience have been the main substance of
discussion.
4. In tackling the issue of attention versus consciousness an often
present implicit confusion tends tomake the debates unfruitful.
Surprisingly often the processes of attention are not clearly dis-
tinguished from the results of these processes as they take one or
another formof experience. It is easily possible that when atten-
tion aids consciousness then selection among the candidate
objects or locations is carried out by the attention mecha-
nism (either bottom-up evoked or top-down controlled), but
the results of this selection as experienced at the phenomenal
level (e.g., enhanced clarity in consciousness of the attended
object) are determined by some mechanism other than atten-
tion. Attention interacts with that other mechanism (e.g., the
CSA), which results in a qualitatively different phenomenal
experience. Taking into account all four above considerations,
let me suggest an approach for how to choose the super-modal
attributes of phenomenal perception in order to evaluate them
in terms of the effects of attention. Let us see what the effects of
attention look like when we analyze them with regard to these
attributes as surfacing in published research and common sci-
entiﬁc knowledge. Thereafter, I will suggest also some other
potentially useful steps for moving forward.
SOME SUGGESTIONS
The principal modality-invariant attributes of phenomenal expe-
rience in the context of the present article are as follows:
• presence of phenomenal experience (either there is or there is
not)
• subjective clarity of phenomenal experience (e.g., vividness,PAS
level, etc.)
• selective emphasis in phenomenal experience (e.g., focus)
• duration of phenomenal experience (e.g., short-lived or longer)
• post-perturbation delay of phenomenal experience (e.g., stim-
ulus perception latency)
• veridicality of content of phenomenal experience (e.g., illusory,
distorted, etc.).
All six listed attributes are emphasized or augmentedwhenCSA
is activated (Mass and Smirnov, 1970; Bachmann, 1994; Baars,
1997a; Ribary, 2005). What about attention? In the following table
the typical or expected effects of attention on the principal phe-
nomenal attributes are systematized. Some of the table entries
indicate the effects consistent with published experimental facts,
some refer to the effects yet to be tested. (It can be easily con-
cluded that the effects are very much dependent on what empirical
phenomena we are considering).
Now, based on the table, let us compare some examples of
the attentional effects. By 1a we specify phenomena where atten-
tion facilitates detection or description of the presence of target
objects such as in the change blindness displays (Jensen et al.,
2011), covert spatial pre-cueing (Carrasco, 2011), bottom-up pop-
out in ﬁltering tasks (Itti et al., 2005), partial report selection from
iconic memory (Ruff et al., 2007; Sligte et al., 2010), etc. By 1b
we specify effects of attention counteracting awareness, such as
in the MIB (Schölvinck and Rees, 2009). By 1c we specify ani-
mal object detection (van Boxtel et al., 2010b), understanding that
one is awake and present in the habitat after spontaneous awaken-
ing, involuntary perception of the alternatives in rivalry displays
Effects of attention on phenomenal attributes of consciousness.
Attribute a: Attention
facilitates
b: Attention
counteracts
c: Attention-
independent
Presence (1) Yes Yes Yes
Clarity (2) Yes ? No
Selective emphasis (3) Yes No No
Duration (4) Yes Yes ?
Post-stimulus delay (5) Yes No ?
Veridicality (6) Yes Yes ?
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(Kim and Blake, 2005), attentional blink to the second target (Dux
and Marois, 2009), delusional compulsory experiences, etc. By
2a such effects can be listed as covert spatial attention (Störmer
et al., 2009; Carrasco, 2011), vividness of subjective experiences
dependent on arousal states, etc. The entry 3a refers to the selec-
tive attention effects in visual search, scene analysis, bottom-up
and top-down spatial attention, dichotic listening, selection from
iconic memory, etc. (Itti et al., 2005; Sligte et al., 2010; Bachmann
et al., 2011). The entry 4a refers to increase of apparent dura-
tion by attention (Seifried and Ulrich, 2011) while 4b refers for
example to the adverse effect of attention on the duration of after-
images (van Boxtel et al., 2010a; Murd and Bachmann, 2011).
For 5a there are phenomena such as prior entry under attention
(Hilkenmeier et al., 2011), release from masking by a pre-cue in
perceptual latency priming (Scharlau and Neumann, 2003), per-
ceptual facilitation in ﬂash-lag displays (Nijhawan and Khurana,
2010), selective spatial attention by pre-cueing (Carrasco, 2011),
etc. With 6a we refer to the cases where attending increases correct
discrimination and content perception (Itti et al., 2005; Carrasco,
2011) while 6b refers to the adverse effects of attention on veridi-
cality of perception. The selection of examples for the latter is
surprisingly rich: illusory percepts due to expectancy, stereotypical
distortions because of learning effects, bias effects from frequency
of use or experimenter effects, etc.
In the table the most interesting cases are where attention can
have mutually opposite effects (e.g., 1a–1b, 4a–4b, 6a–6b). This
may be interpreted as evidence against attention being the mech-
anism of consciousness, which is the view supported in this paper.
However, this interpretation can be consistent with two different
views on the issue of relations between attention and conscious-
ness. For one view, assuming that attention is the very mechanism
of consciousness the above contradictory facts are detrimental.
However, if we take a broader view and assume that attention
is only one of the many mechanisms having an impact on the
work of the consciousness mechanism then there is an easy way to
understand why attention can have opposite effects on conscious
experience. In this it-depends-type of view attention simply has
one or another effect on consciousness depending on how it is
applied onto perceptual data processing.
Here is an analogy: blowing air on the ﬂame can either ignite
and facilitate ﬁre or exterminate it, depending on the intensity and
time of action on the ﬂame. If attention is the ambient “wind”
and consciousness is the “ﬂame,” a sufﬁciently strong and durable
attending can speed up the decay of conscious experience (e.g.,
with afterimage experience).Yet,when air is standstill and nowind
is present, the ﬂame still burns.Attention as amechanism that itself
is not a consciousnessmechanismcan lead also to both the increase
of veridicality of perception or increase of non-veridicalities. This
depends on whether the bottom-up perceptual data or top-down,
memory based, and expectancy-controlled information is fostered
relatively more by attention. But what is clear though is that atten-
tion is neither sufﬁcient nor necessary for consciousness in general.
It alone cannot explain the various phenomena. It also need not
guarantee consciousness of contentwhen steadily applied on a sen-
sory experience having that content. However, it may be necessary
for some aspects of consciousness to show up (e.g., extreme clarity
or priority in entry) or take one or another value (e.g., duration
of experience).
If noneof thedifferent traditionalmechanisms is separately suf-
ﬁcient for consciousness then a nagging question emerges: what
is different in the activities of the constituent mechanisms of the
unspecialized set of traditional mechanisms when consciousness
with its content emerges? I do not have a good answer to this.
As we saw above, attention cannot be the decisive mechanism.
Perceptual and memory representation can be and often largely
are pre-conscious. Cognitive control does not have content. Intu-
itively, it seems more natural that there is a mechanism specialized
for “awarding” consciousness quality for the representational con-
tents mediated by the speciﬁc, specialized memory systems and
perceptual content systems. In this casewithCSAat hand it is easier
to understand why attention in one case facilitates consciousness
of contents and in some other case does not or even dampens it.
Attention as the principal mechanism of selection out of alterna-
tive informational options can either facilitate the working or use
of the CSA or inhibit (or abstain from use of) it.
The likely possibilities of relationship between attention mech-
anisms and the CSA mechanism are as follows: (1) attention
mechanism acting upon CSA,which in turn leads to either facilita-
tion of consciousness-level microgenesis of the explicit experience
or to inhibition of the consciousness of target; (2) attention mech-
anismandCSAacting independently and in parallel ﬁrst, only then
followed by mutual interaction (e.g., conscious experience captur-
ing attentional resources, or attentionally ampliﬁed pre-conscious
representation capturing CSA resources). Which one of the above
relationships is valid orwhether both can be implemented requires
special research in future.
At present there are several candidate mechanisms for
acting as the special mechanistic intermediate between pre-
conscious information-representing activity and conscious-level
information-representing means. In the family of thalamocortical
interaction theories assuming a special role for the so-called non-
speciﬁc-thalamic units for upgrading the pre-conscious cortical
contents there are several varieties (e.g., Magoun, 1958; Bach-
mann, 1984, 1999, 2007; Bogen, 1995; Newman, 1995; Baars,
1997a; Purpura and Schiff, 1997; Llinás and Ribary, 2001; John,
2005; Ribary, 2005; Ward, 2011). Despite the “family resem-
blances,” these researchers think that the pre-conscious corti-
cal contents quite reliably represented after speciﬁc relay units
transfer information from receptors to cortical modules become
conscious contents as soon as they are modulated by thalamo-
cortical general-purpose activity (the CSA mechanism). In some
of the models post-synaptic EPSPs of the content-carrying cor-
tical neurons are the targets for non-speciﬁc-thalamic modula-
tion (e.g., Bachmann, 1994). In other models oscillating activ-
ity of the speciﬁc representational neurons and non-speciﬁc
modulation-systemneurons becomes synchronized for conscious-
ness with its speciﬁc content to emerge (Llinás and Ribary,
2001; John, 2005). In a recent conceptualization termed “bind-
ing binding” Bachmann (2007) envisaged two processes of bind-
ing by oscillatory synchrony – ﬁrst-order binding of features
into perceptual objects by synchronizing feature-speciﬁc neu-
rons pre-consciously and second-order binding of the bound
pre-conscious objects into general consciousness-level represen-
tation. The second-order binding is executed via the oscil-
lations of the non-speciﬁc CSA system. In this version, a
representation is essentially a dynamic representation. Attentional
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network can be though either to aid pre-conscious binding, bind-
ing for consciousness, or exhausting (or desynchronizing) the
oscillatory resources in case of adverse effects on conscious-
ness.
In the reentrant theory it is assumed that for the speciﬁc
contents represented by primary sensory cortices to become con-
sciously represented, they need to be accessed by the reentrant
signals from the higher-order cortical nodes sent back to the
already activated earlier units (Lamme,2003; vanGaal andLamme,
2011). Bottom-up plus top-down cycles of mutual activation are
sufﬁcient for consciousness of its contents. In this theory the
mechanism is not neuroanatomically distinct (albeit interacting
with differently placed other modules) as is the case with thala-
mic theories. It is functionally deﬁned, implemented by the neural
units that are neuroanatomically the same. Although Lamme and
van Gaal explain attentional effects both independent and asso-
ciated with consciousness, there are some questionable aspects to
this theory. First of all, it would be computationally and adap-
tively suspect to leave both the functions of representation and
modulation to the units of the same neural system. One and the
same structural system shouldhavedifﬁculty in transforming from
content-representing system to a control system and vice versa,
unless some mystique would be brought in.
Let me end with a few concluding remarks. In order to better
understand the nature of attention and consciousness and their
relation (i) some conceptual distinctions either absent or only
implicitly involved in theorizing so far are necessary. This applies
to the distinction between: processes and dynamic results of the
processes; content-speciﬁc attributes of conscious experiences and
universal, content-invariant attributes of conscious experiences;
possibly opposite effects of the same mechanism (e.g., attention)
on consciousness depending on the characteristics of inﬂuence
that the same mechanism has. Also, (ii) it may be advisable to
abandon both the attention-as-consciousness, view, and the view
that consciousness emerges by default from thework of traditional
mechanisms of perception, memory, and attention. Instead, let us
ﬁnd adeservedplace for the specialmechanismof consciousness in
addition to the perceptual, attentional,memory, cognitive control,
and other standardmechanisms long acknowledged.Methodolog-
ically, (iii) in addition to the mostly correlational studies (NCC)
more mechanistic and causal-effects related research is needed.
Let us accept that there is a special (thalamocortical interactive?)
mechanism and a corresponding theoretical mechanistic concept
for the dedicated CSA brain process(es) responsible for upgrading
pre-conscious results of the perception up to the consciousness-
level results. This concept is functionally apart from the concepts of
perception and attention. Therefore,wemayhave better chances to
solve the attention versus consciousness puzzle. Indeed, both per-
ception and attention can be independent of the explicit conscious
experience.
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